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BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
MILO W. AND CLEOWN WATTS 
Case No. 19380 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
T~1s action was in the nature of a foreclosure brought 
·.1tn•:ff appellant, Utah Farm Production Credit Association, 
··"T,r,00.: and hereafter called PCA > on four promissory notes 
.. ,. '·~spondents I hereinafter called Watts) and one Buford L. 
J :.121beth A. Gregory (referred to as Gregorys hereafter). 
co~ea ;n the action were Agricultural Stablization and 
·c·o'.V~t1on Service, Commodity Credit Corporation, Scott 
~r,s"n, and Ron Burns, dba Stephenson & Burns Pump Service, 
'"ul F~rtn1ng, dba Paul Farthing Grading Contractor, who were 
-. r ~ortgagees or lien claimants on the subject property. 
Respondents crossclaimed against Gregorys on a Uniform 
·" >t·3 ··ontract covering 481 acres sold by Watls to Gregorys, 
~r~d a portion of the land included in the mortgage upon 
. ,.- l ' sought foreclosure . In addition PCA attempted to 
"•urr c)[ted security interest in equipment and crops 
pursuant to a security agreement executed July 18, 1978, by ,,,, 
Watts and Gregorys. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Watts take serious issue with PCA's Statement of 
Disposition in Lower Court and assert that the "Partial Summan 
Judgment" alluded to in PCA's said statement was only an 
acknowledgment or admission on the part of both Watts and Gregor'.· 
that the promissory notes being sued on by PCA had in fact been 
signed by the respective parties and a ruling of the court that 
such fact was established. PCA' s assertion (without reference'·' 
any part of the record) that "the only issues remaining as to tn' 
exact amount owing to PCA because of farming operations from t~ 
year 1980 and whether the home farm (remaining property ownerl :'y 
Watts not sold to Gregory) is subject to the mortgage" is an 
absolute misstatement of fact. 
Indeed many other issues had been raised by the 
pleadings (about which discovery had been conducted and on wh1ci1 
the Court had not ruled) that remained to be tried. It is true 
that counsel for PCA did submit a Proposed Partial Summary 
Judgment to the Court couched in the language used in their 
statement. Such Proposed Partial Summary Judgment was obiect2 1 
by the undersigned, and the Court refused to sign it. 
Accordingly, it is not a part of the record, and PCA attached ' 
copy thereof as an exhibit to its Memorandum Opposing Watts' 
Motion for Summary Judgment. <R.332-3) 
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On December 15, 1981, when both sides had moved for 
,,J,ar'/ Judgment and the matter was then argued, there were some 
,~~ 1 , 1 onal exhibits offered to the Court by Watts (which had just 
ccior thereto been received from PCA pursuant to Watts' Motion to 
o':oducio Documents), which exhibits are attached as an additional 
suoplemental record, and to which reference will be made 
*reinafter. Said exhibits were indeed received by the Court on 
:ecember 15, 1981, and admitted as exhibits by stipulation of the 
;utles, even though no reference was made to that in the minute 
0 iltry of the court on said date. (R.298) These "Items"or exhibits 
<cere before the trial court, were quoted in memoranda of both 
,',Arties and were alluded to in subsequent depositions. (See, for 
'<rl.mple, R. 2 91) 
(We note in examining the record that in Volume 1 of the 
'onscr ipt the numbering of pages runs to 2 98 and then resumes in 
,Jiume 2 with number 290, so there are two sets of record pages 
''"11119 from 290 through 298. The reference above to page 298 is 
, ' Volume 1. The reference to 2 91 above is in Volume 2. ) 
The thrust of Watts' Motion for Summary Judgment was 
'",,''· , settlement agreement had been entered into between PCA and 
,,darits Gregory on July 16, 1981, ( R. 268 to 285) which 
µment, Watts contended, failed to expressly reserve PCA's 
<ht> against Watts as part of the same transaction and 
"rord1ngly constituted a release of Watts from all obligation to 
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Following the submittal of the remaining memoranda. 
docketing of depositions, motions to strike, and filing of 
affidavits, the matter was submitted and the court renot1ced 'ne 
matter, together with defendants Watts' Motion for Surrunary 
Judgment and Foreclosure on the Uniform Real Estate Contract 
against defendant Gregory and remaining defendants, for hearino; 
June 7, 1983. At that time the court granted defendants Watls' 
Motion for Summary Judgment against plaintiff, struck the earL~ 
Partial Summary Judgment for plaintiff, denied plaintiff's Moti0~ 
for Summary Judgment and granted Watts' Motion for Surrunary 
Judgment and Judgment of Foreclosure over and against defendant 
Gregory and remaining defendants. (R.411 and Supplemental Record 
"Court Proceedings" filed October 11, 1983, with this court.I Tr-
Sumrnary Judgment and Judgment of Foreclosure were docketed witn 
the Clerk of the Court July 28, 1983, and PCA filed its Notice "f 
Appeal August 11, 1983. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants Watts seek to have the judgment of the lower 
court affirmed in all particulars. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Counsel for respondents discovered in preparing thi~ 
brief (as noted above) that a series of exhibits receivc>d bv "~ 
court at the time of argument of defendants' Motion for swrunac' 
Judgment on December 15, 1981, which were identified as Items 
through 17, were not included as part of the record on appeal ' -
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oot mentioned in the Minute Entry of the trial court for that 
iR.2981 Said Items constituted documents furnished by the 
, 1 nt1tt to these defendants pursuant to a Motion to Produce 
1ments, and the parties stipulated that they be received into 
·::Jenee. (Items 12 through 15 and Item 17 were copies of cases 
:s,od at argument, but the remaining Items 1 through 11 and 16 are 
: 1e exhibits with which we are concerned.) 
The undersigned furnish the exhibits therefore as a 
sJµplement to the record because, while most of them appear as 
s'.tachments to affidavits or depositions, four of them do not 
"t~erwise appear in the record, and reference will be made to them 
·,ereafter. Moreover, these exhibits were referred to in several 
iepos it ions by those numbers (sometimes the number is prefaced 
•lth the word "item" and sometimes with the word "exhibit">, and 
,:chout them in that form and order being available to the court 
~uld make the language of the depositions meaningless. 
It should also preliminarily be observed that double 
:e~ositions of several parties--Milo Watts, Cleown Watts, Buford 
0 regory and Tom Boyer--were taken. Accordingly, the undersigned 
<~ refer to the depositions with a Roman numeral in front to 
'llcate which of the two is intended, such as I Boyer or II Boyer 
·tority. 
PCA's Statement of Fact is both sketchy and selective 
cannot therefore be adopted by Watts. Accordingly there 
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follows a chronological summary of the facts as disclosed by , ~" 
record and depositions. 
PCA is a lending institution in the business of 
financing agriculture, and in order to obtain a loan the farmer 
must buy stock in PCA. The amount of stock required is directl; 
related to the amount of the loan obtained. (Childs Depo. 13. J 
To obtain a loan a farmer would complete an application, 
furnish a financial statement, a profit and loss statement for the 
three years prior to the application, and a budget or project ion 
as to how the asked-for funds would be used during the coming 
operating year. <Childs Depo. 17.) The loan would then be 
considered by the loan officer or lending committee depending on 
the amount sought. The necessary documents, security instruments, 
promissory notes, etc., would then be executed. <Childs Depo. 19-
20.) 
In the event a loan was not repaid within the usual 
twelve month loan period, the note could be renewed and new 
security agreements reflecting changes in collateral or real 
estate being pledged would be executed. Each time an application 
for renewal occurred a new budget or summary of the purpose of th" 
loan and proposed expenditures would be worked out with the mem~ 
borrower.<Childs Depo. 20; I Boyer Depo. 69 -71; II Milo Watts 
Depo. 20-22. > 
Watts had mortgaged their home, farm and range grounu ir, 
and around the Kanosh, Utah, area comprising approximately 1,16 6 
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,~res to PCA in connection with annual operating loans beginning 
.. 1 1947.(l Milo Watts Dep. 4) The last recorded mortgage on said 
Jrorerty was executed August 9, 1974, recorded August 16, 1974, in 
:he Millard County Recorder's Off ice. ( R .18-21) Included within 
said acreage was a 481-acre irrigated hay and grain farm which 
htts sold to Buford L. Gregory on August 14, 1978, on a Uniform 
Real Estate Contract which provided, among other things, that the 
buyer, Gregory, as his down payment would assume and pay to PCA 
tne then balance of the Watts loan of $74,343.65, together with a 
first mortgage to Ag Land Mortgage Company in the amount of 
526,194.19, and the remaining $260,462,16 balance to be paid in 20 
annual installments of $24,585.00, the first payment to be due 
\ugust 1, 1979. (R.25-27) Also sold at the same time were some 
items of equipment relating to the farm: a hay chopper, baler, 
swather, two-ton truck, ditcher, two feed wagons, a combine and a 
carryall scraper (Bill of Sale, R-28). Even prior to the 
execution of the aforementioned contract, Watts and Buford Gregory 
aud his wife, Elizabeth, executed jointly a Security Agreement 
;11th PCA pledging certain equipment used on the said farm, in a 
document which was blank at the time the Watts signed it (I Cleown 
Watts Depo. 44, 49-53), but which now shows on its face 15 cows, 
heifers, and bears a date of July 18, 1978 (R.30). 
At or about the time of the sale from Watts to Gregory a 
joan application was made increasing the principal on the PCA loan 
trom $74,343.65 to $104,884.00. That application appears 
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repeatedly in the record, but the clearest copy of its pages 15 
Item 1 in the Supplemental Record noted above. It is to be 
observed on this PCA document that it was signed by the president, 
Vaughn Mills, July 21, 1978, as having been approved, along with 
the signatures of the other members of the loan committee, and on 
its face showed that new credit 1 i fe insurance in the upper right-
hand block was written on Dr. Gregory for $60,000.00 and Elizabeth 
Gregory for $10,000.00 with the note that Milo and Cleown Watts' 
insurance was "in force until 1-79." Also on the face of page 
it shows an entry January 1, 1978: "proceeds from sale of farm 114 
acres)" and on the second page under the heading "Ownership and 
Management" indicates the sale of the irrigated farm to a medical 
doctor for the sum cf $369, 000, includes 480 acres plus the hay 
and equipment and continues "that the purchaser, Dr. Buford L. 
Gregory and his wife, Elizabeth A., have agreed to sign on the 
full loan balance until paid in full, as a result of new funds set 
up to operate in the sum of $20,000." It concludes, "Milo Watts 
has agreed to continue with the operation this year principally i~ 
the role of an advisor and consultant." 
Under the following heading, "Financial Information," 
the financial statements of Milo Watts as of May 1978 and of 
Buford Gregory as of February 1978 are outlined, showing a net 
worth in Watts of $538,914 and in Gregory $808,294. <This, of 
course, disputes PCA' s Statement of Fact which claims that "at the 
time of this sale Watts were indebted to PCA in the amount of 
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S!'J4,884.00"--PCA Brief, Page 3). So $20,000.00 of additional 
· 1nds wer~ loaned to Gregory at the time the Gregorys became 
]ember-borrowers and took over the 481-acre farm. 
Watts stated that Gregory was not only to take over the 
loan at PCA and the first mortgage and to make annual payments of 
the balance as the contract states, but that substitute collateral 
in the form of real estate owned by Gregory in Arizona was to 
replace the Watts ground and mortgage as of the annual renewal 
:1me, January 1979.CI Milo Watts Depo. 20-23 and 35-36; I Cleown 
~tts Depo. 14-15 and 17.) CCleown Watts states that this 
representation was given to them expressly by the PCA 
representative who handled the transaction, Steven L. Adamson, 
when the Watts first came to the Salt Lake office of PCA with Dr. 
Gregory at the time of the sale of the farm)CPages 14-15). That 
testimony is corroborated by Thomas Boyer, PCA's representative, 
who was the agent handling the Watts-Gregory loan and the party 
~ost familiar with it (Childs Depo. 32-33). Mr.Boyer repeatedly 
discussed with his superiors and PCA's attorney, James Dunn, the 
sJbstituting of the Arizona collateral for the Watts property (! 
'Jyer Depo. 49), had discussions with the Watts regarding it,(! 
301·er Depo. 12-15), made notes on a loan document and made efforts 
~ secure a trust deed and mortgage on the Arizona property as 
<:11 be demonstrated later CI Boyer Depo. 11). He made efforts to 
a~omplish the release of Watts' collateral and substitution of 
·3regory collateral (II Boyer Depo. 28-29), and it was his intent 
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on behalf of PCA to get Gregory to sell the Arizona property ana 
pay off the loan (II Boyer Depa. 55-56), which is further 
corroborated by Item 6--page 3, and Items 7, 8, 9 and 10 in the 
Supplemental Record. 
Dr. Gregory further confirms that understanding in his 
deposition, acknowledging that he went with Watts to PCA at the 
time of the real estate contract and assumed the Watts debt 11 
Buford Gregory Depa. 12, hereafter IB Gregory Depa."), that he 
intended to substitute the Arizona property on the loan and to ~; 
off Watts and release them therefrom on condition that PCA would 
give him long-term financing (IB Gregory Depo. 24-25, 29-31) and 
further that such long-term financing would either pay off or pay 
down the Watts obligation (IB Gregory depo. 43 and 46). Finally, 
he was asked in his first deposition at page 48 by his own 
counsel: 
"When you were talking about the long-term financing 
with PCA, did you intend to borrow enough from the PCA to pa; 
off your obligation to Watts on the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract?" 
Answer: 
that 
real 
not 
"I am not really sure at this time, but it seems to me 
that was discussed, but I couldn't tell you with any 
degree of certainty at this time. I think so, but I am 
sure." 
So indeed he thinks the intention in getting the long-
term financing would have been not only to pay off Watts' loan, 
but the whole Watts contract. 
In January of 1979 a new annual loan was written up un 
Item 2 which shows continuing in force the credit life insurance 
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. Jc. Gregory and Elizabeth Gregory, but no renewal of the Watts 
In the section under the heading, "Loan Liquidation" 
~hows land sales proceeds at $80,000.00, referring to the 
.·.c:zona property as is made more explicit on page 2 under heading 
'?epil yrnen t" 
"to further explain members' proposed land sale the following 
may be helpful. Member is selling 14 acres of land zoned for 
multiple dwellings in the Mesa area. The land is valued at 
$1.00 per square foot with member asking $40,000.00 per acre 
for a total selling price of $560,000.00. With a mortgage 
balance due of $20,000.00 member has equity of $540,000.00. 
These sale proceeds will be used to provide the necessary 
funds to pay off subject loan in full." 
It continues under the heading, "Financial Information": 
"Dr. Gregory has a very strong financial statement 
characterized by excellent real estate equities. Member's 
current statement shows a net worth of $1,606,000.00 against 
total liab1lies of $590,000. His financial statement dated 
2. 1 78 showed a net worth of $808,000.00 with total liabilities 
of $288,000.00. The increase in liabilities reflects the 
farm purchase and a balance due of $250,000.00. It is the 
opinion of this writer that some of the borrower's real 
estate holdings are overstated as they are listed at optimum 
market prices. Nevertheless, member has a strong statement 
in addition to having an excellent earning potential from his 
medical practice." 
Under heading "Recommendation": 
"We recorrunend the approval of the subject loan as 
presented based on member's financial strength and repayment 
capacity. In doing so it is recorrunended that we continue to 
include Milo Watts on the loan including the present real 
estate mortgage until Dr. Gregory's land sale can be 
finalized with subject loan balance paid off in full." 
Item 3 is the transmittal letter to Dr. Gregory advising 
:~at the new loan increase of $198,000.00 has been approved, 
.n:luding the $74,000.00-plus of the Watts debt he assumed, plus 
• 1e additional $20,000.00 Gregory borrowed to operate the farm ir. 
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1978. It is to be noted that the letter is addressed solely to 
Dr. Gregory, not to Gregory and Watts. This is confirmed by the 
Milo Watts testimony that following the sale to Gregorys he was 
never consulted about a proposed annual budget with regard to 
operating the farm, nor was he given any accounting regarding 
disbursements made and for what after August of 1978 <II Milo 
Watts Depa. 20-22). Tom Boyer adds that no annual renewal of 
documentation with regard to security agreements or projected 
budgets was done in January of 1979 <I Boyer Depa. 70-71). He 
says specifically, 
"But annually it would be updated and brought into focus. 
Normally the way that is done is an inventory would be done 
and those items found in that inventory would be listed on 
there with serial numbers. Those serial numbers would then 
be related directly onto the security agreement and that 
would be the normal course." 
Q. "So no new renewal security agreement as of January '79 ever 
was prepared for the Watts's signature. Is that correct?" 
A. "That is correct." 
Q. "That gives you some reason to believe that alternate 
security or collateral should have been obtained and that wes 
the original intention, correct?" 
A. "This is what I am basing my opinion on, yes." (page 71l 
Item #5 was the additional loan report on March 19, 
1979, seeking an additional loan of $20,000.00 for the purpose o' 
building a shed on the farm, for which Gregory applied. It is 
noted in page 2 of the repayment plan that 75% or $18,000.00 ot 
the cost of the shed was to be repaid from ASCS. 
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Tom Boyer identified ASCS as "the Agricultural 
ab1l1zation & Conservation Service." When asked about this Item 
,, Mr. Boyer indicated that it had been written prior to his 
-ecom1ng an employee of PCA, but that he had some involvement with 
.c after he became an employee and more particularly after 
cdat1ons with Gregory had soured some time in October of 1979 and 
cnat he had contacted a Mr. Ron Childs (no relation to his 
sJpervisor, Les Childs) to advise ASCS that PCA was in a 
'foreclosure posture" and notwithstanding the language on page 2 
A Item 5 that "repayment to PCA for the $18,000.00 increase will 
:ome from ASCS after the shed has been constructed. This is not 
"xpected to be received until September of 1979," that no payment 
,·as received from ASCS and that he, Boyer, "suggested (to Mr. Ron 
~n1lds) that he might hold that for a while until such time as we 
•ere able to solve out or see what direction we were going to 
:ake. And to my knowledge, no payment was ever made to PCA." 
11 Boyer Depo. 31-34). He concluded that no such payment came, 
': least during the term he was in PCA' s employ from June of 1979 
:hrough December of 1980. Cp. 34) 
Boyer dictated and signed the remaining Items 6, 7, 9 
.-.d 10, and was the addressee on Item 8 and therefore testified 
1om direct personal knowledge. 
Item 6 was titled "Crop Inspection Report" and was typed 
~1s direction following his inspection of the Gregory farm made 
:J,~.eotime around the 14th of August 1979. Page 3 of Item 6 states: 
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"The Gregory loan has excellent potential of becoming 
one of our best loans. Current problems are centered aroun 0 
the transition from Mesa, Arizona, Kanosh area. The farminy 
is different, the people different and that has required · 
change. The sale of 13.2 acres in Arizona will conclude the 
change and then a year or two of operating here will give 
them adequate experience required to make the change. They 
also plan to purchase the farm bordering them on the north 
The SCS is presently studying soil and water information for 
production possibilities if Dee's check on the deal will be 
on track. This addition will make the farm a good sized 
operation.• Dr. Gregory is currently in a lawsuit with a 
character in Phoenix who is attempting to force sale of his 
13.2 acres. It is fully anticipated that Dr. Gregory will 
win and if he does he has sale for the property at $400, 000. 
This will help him to clear us out and make a sizable down 
payment on the new farm. Then we will provide annual 
operating money with possibly a cattle loan also. These 
people are learning fast and will be an excellent group of 
operators in a short while. The financial position is 
strong. Dr. Gregory still has his medical profession backing 
him up. All things considered we are looking at a number 1 
or nuir.ber 2 loan at renewal. (Emphasis added) 
Boyer was asked if that language were his own, if he had 
proofread the document after it had been typed, and if it fairly 
reflected what he wanted to say, to all of which questions he 
answered yes. He continued, the said Item 6 was critically 
necessary as basis for getting Item 7 approved. (II Boyer Depo. 
31) Item 7, the additional loan action report shows on its face 
the sale of 13.2 acres in Mesa, Arizona, for a liquidating amount 
of $400,000.00. Under the box "Additional Loan Papers to be 
Obtained" is listed "mortgage on 13.2 acres, description 
attached," and a handwritten note saying "no more increases unti' 
Arizona property sold" with initials and the date of December 7 , 
1978. Page 2 of the Item says under the heading "Loan Purpose" 
"increase to provide interim financing of $48,890.00 and living 
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expenses. Expenses have run more than was originally anticipated. 
~~so some attorney's fees are needed for a lawsuit involving the 
, 1 2 acres in Arizona. Even if Gregory loses, he will still get 
,]65,000.00." 
Under the heading "Repayment" it states "they have a 
.:omm1tment on the '79 hay crop which will approximate $66,000.00. 
~he sale of the Arizona property will liquidate most of the total 
liability ($314,863.00)." 
Boyer testified about that exhibit at some length, to 
•'11ch we will refer in a moment, but in connection therewith 
:est1fied that Item 8 was received by him from Thomas Christensen 
Jf F'abian & Clendenin, Dr. Gregory's attorney, pursuant to his 
request for a copy of the legal description of the Arizona 
eroperty. He was asked the question, "Why did you ask for the 
description?" and answered, "In order that we might obtain a deed 
Jf trust." CII Boyer Depo. 10) He continued that having received 
'.he description he prepared the promissory note, the deed of 
trust, and Item 9. When asked about that he said it bore two 
jates originally, the date of August 21, 1979, corrected to 
September 13, 1979, and that Items 9 and 7 were typed at 
essentially the same time, that it (Item 9) was indeed mailed to 
:r. Gregory on the later date, and that enclosed with it were a 
·:om1ssory note and a deed of trust. He was asked the question: 
~hat was the deed of trust?" and answered, "The deed of trust 
,ie:tained to this 13.2 acres of land in Arizona." 
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Q. "Who prepared the deed of trust?" 
A. "We did." 
Q. "We meaning?" 
A. "Utah Farm Production Credit, secretary Lucille Williams." 
Q. "Did you furnish her the description as received from Mr. 
Christensen?" 
A. "Yes as accompanied in the letter of Item 8." 
Q. "Did you mail out that deed of trust?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "In this reg. letter Item number 9?" 
Ae "Yes." 
Q. "Along with the promissory note?" 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "Did you get either the trust deed or the promissory note 
back from Mr. Gregory?" 
A. "We received back the promissory note. We did not receive 
back the deed of trust."<II Boyer Depo. 12.) 
At pages 5 through 18 in the same deposition Mr. Boyer 
indicates that the additional increase of $48,890.00 reflected in 
Item 7 was not to have been disbursed until the trust deed 
enclosed with Item 9 had been returned and that the penciled-in 
note on Item 7 was in the handwriting of Vaughn Mills, the 
president, and corroborated his earlier testimony in his first 
deposition in which from memory he had said he had remembered a 
notation to the effect, "Hold funds until Arizona property has 
been secured." <I Boyer Depo. 11, line 8) He then continues on 
pages 18 and 19 to indicate that Mr. Naylor, the Salt Lake office 
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:11anager at the time released to Gregory without condition the 
_Jnds conditionally authorized in the said $48,000.00 increase, 
irj did so without the trust deed because there was a lien on the 
Arizona property that would need to be lifted before they could 
·ecord a trust deed and further because the Gregorys' account was 
overdrawn. (II Boyer Depo. 18-19) 
Boyer was asked: 
"Q Was there any discussion held at that time about the trust 
deed on the Arizona property that you referred to in Item 9? 
"A. Yes 
·'Q. What was the discussion about that? 
"A. It was not much of a discussion actually. Dr. Gregory simply 
informed me that we would not be receiving the deed of trust 
on the Arizona property; that since we had backed out on our 
end of things he was not about to give us the deed of trust 
on the Arizona property. 
"Q. Did he talk in terms of long-term financing with regard to 
that deed of trust? 
"A. No. 
''Q. Didn't he indicate one of the reasons for backing out was 
that he expected a long-term financing in order to give you a 
deed of trust on the Arizona property? 
"A. I understand. By long-term financing, you are talking about a 
long term relationship. 
'Q. Over a period of years rather than a one-year budget 
situation? 
'A. Okay, yes, he expected us to carry him from year to year 
rather than being paid out annualy as we normally would--as 
Utah Farm Production Credit normally expected its customers 
to do in this type of a situation. 
"This was an annual loan. We normally expected this type of 
loan to be paid out yearly or at least reduced to a very 
minimum carry-over. And Dr. Gregory felt that since he was 
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just starting we should carry the whole amount over. And '"" 
were simply not in a pas it ion. The loan was too weak to de, 
that." III Boyer Depa. 14-15) 
In his earlier deposition Boyer had indicated as follows: 
"I met with Dr. Gregory several times, but to the best of my 
memory, I discussed this loan increase of 48, nearly 
$49,000.00 with him with the intention that we would tie up 
the Arizona property for this and that lf we did tie up the 
Arizona property with this, that there would be additiona: 
advances to come." (I Boyer De po. 5 9) . 
So, when relations with Dr. Gregory soured, he then 
mailed Item #10 to Gregory suggesting, "You may want to make plans 
for selling the Arizona property as soon as possible." This Item 
is dated November 21, 1979. 
It was in this same time frame that drafts came in 
against the said $48,000.00 increase as reflected in Item 4. The 
first of these dated September 19, 1979, is for $24,500.00 and 
indicates that it was a land payment to Milo Watts. Mr. Boyer 
identified that draft and indicated the signature of Lindy Ann 
Gregory was that of Dr. Gregory's daughter, who was an author i ?.ea 
signatory. III Boyer Depo. 161 He was asked specifically: 
"Q. Is there anything on the document that indicates who at PCA 
approved the draft and permits the funds to be transferred?' 
"A. Yes." 
"Q. Whose initials appear on that?" 
"A. It is his name, Thad. 
indicating it is Thad 
Production Credit, is 
three of these drafts 
The name Thad appears on there, 
Allen, one of the loan off1cers at 
the one who authorized in fact all 
on item 4." (II Boyer Depa. 16-17) 
Boyer later admitted that there is nothing in Item 7 
that would suggest that $24,000.00 of the $48,000.00 increase 
-18-
,r~a was to go toward making the land purchase payment to the 
,,:ts and then asked if he ever corrununicated to the Watts that 
··,JS money was being borrowed from PCA to pay on their real estate 
·ontract with Gregory, his answer was, 
"I have no recollection of a discussion of that nature." 
ce ·.;as then asked the question, "At any time?", and answered, 
"At any time. I better correct that. I may have discussed 
with them after the fact and after things had deteriorated 
that that's where it did come from, but prior to that and 
irrunediately thereafter there was no discussion." (II Boyer 
De po . 21- 2 2 l 
In the same deposition, under examination by Gregorys' 
o:torney, Mr. Boyer elaborated further as follows: 
.. ~ 
"A. 
What is a number 1 or a number 2 loan?" 
At PCA, we had four, five interest rates. We have two better 
than average interest rates, a B rate, we called it for our 
average customer, and then two higher rates for our poorer 
customers, so to speak. At this point in time, it was my 
opinion that we would get the Arizona property sold and we'd 
have the loan paid down or out, in which case we would be in 
an excellent financial position with them, because of the 
security strength and so forth, and in that case we would 
have a 1 or a 2 loan." 
A number 1 or number 2 would have been 
Indicating one of our better loans.• (II Boyer Depo. 561 
On further examination by the undersigned he was asked: 
Now, in fact the items on the first page of item #7 relating 
to the Mesa property, and the reference to having it sold and 
getting the trust deed, had they not been there, would you 
have recommended that this increase would have happened? 
~. No. I might add that the reason the 13.2 acres is only on 
the front and not under the security, is it had the lis 
pendens on it. And I was instructed not to list it as 
security, because we could not get free clear title on 
it. 
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"Q. You would not have been able to have a valid claim against 
with this lis pendens against you? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. With regard to that I think you have testified to it. Who 
was it that asked for the increases, Gregory or Watts? 
"A. Gregory." <II Boyer Depo. 61-62) 
He was then asked whether Watts and Gregory were co-
makers or principal guarantors and following objections and a 
colloquy for some pages, he then expressed his opinion and 
summarized the facts as follows: 
"It was and currently is my understanding that they 
basically define each as follows: A co-signer is a person 
who signs a promissory note, who has a direct involvement in 
the funds being borrowed, and the repayment of those funds 
and in the use of those funds. Most commonly, the co-signer 
has a financial interest in the funds. 
"Guarantor, a person who signs the promissory note, who 
has an indirect involvement in the funds being borrowed. The 
person is offering his or her financial strength to support 
another's endeavor. In case of default, his or her assets 
will be called upon in amounts sufficient to meet the 
delinquent loan amount. 
"Q. Is that your understanding? 
"A. That was my understanding as I worked at PCA and the banks 
and so forth. Therefore, as follows: 
"My testimony is based on those terms being defined as 1 
just heretofore defined them. The Gregorys were the sole 
managers of the property, funds and equipment on the 
Gregory/Watts farm, as referred to by the Gregory/Watts far~ 
to distinguish between this and the loans on other Watts 
property. Gregorys requested and drafted all funds that wer 
disbursed. Watts requested none of them, but did sign lhP 
notes, indicating some level of acceptance. In all cases, 
repayment was to come from Gregory's income, either from farrT 
production or real estate holdings. Watts were not expected 
to make any repayment, except in case of default. 
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l 
"In cases of the primary security in all cases, the 
~r1mary security was that of Gregorys and secondarily that of 
Watts. 
"That was my understanding of the 109 acres, that it was 
the Gregorys' and that the cattle were Gregorys'. That is 
what I was sent down there to collect. That is what I was 
after. 
"So based on that definition and those facts I would 
make the judgment that in my opinion, Watts were guarantors 
to Gr egorys." (I I Boyer Depa. 62-65). 
Perhaps Mr. Boyer's understanding of the facts is best 
'"~~arized in the following exchange in his first deposition: 
"Q. Were you ever involved in a conversation either before you 
left PCA's employ or afterward, in which you discussed with 
Mr. Childs the fact that it was the Watts's understanding 
that when the January following the Gregory purchase rolled 
around that the Watts's remaining property was to be released 
from the mortgage and alternate security or collateral in 
Arizona or elsewhere was to be supplied by Gregorys? Do you 
remember having any discussion along those lines with Mr. 
Childs at any point in time? 
"A. I do not remember discussing it, in other words going into 
his office and saying, 'Here's the way I see it.' At various 
times when we would travel to the attorney together or when 
we were in discussion of the case, I did indicate to him that 
I felt that Milo was basically--maybe I shouldn't use this 
term--an innocent victim of this loan." (I Boyer Depo. 48-49) 
There was one additional loan to Gregorys only in June 
f 19 79, which cancer ned Wat ts in only two ways: First, in 
'01rnection with said loan Gregorys executed an assignment of their 
~u1ty in the farm purchase agreement (the Uniform Real Estate 
:Dtract noted above> to PCA, which was recorded June 28, 1979, in 
·1e Millard County Recorder's Office. (R.23-24) That increased 
'Jan is reflected by promissory note in the amount of $38,890.00 
:ac~d ,June 1, 19 79, signed only by the Gregorys and marked Exhibit 
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A attached to the original Complaint of plaintiffs (R.22 J J'hdi 
note and assignment will figure into the security agreement 
referred to above executed by the Watts and the Gregorys 1n Jui 
of 1978 and which is attached as Exhibit H to plaintiff's 
Complaint (R.29-30) as will be discussed hereinafter. 
We should here mention that out of the increase 
reflected in Item 7 above, Gregorys got permission from Boyer to 
pay $5,000.00 attorney's fee to an Arizona counsel (!B Greyoty 
Depo. 26). 
Cleown Watts was asked several times why she and her 
husband signed the promissory notes of January, March and 
September of 1979 (! Cleown Watts Depo. 9, 12) and explained tha' 
it was her understanding that as of the first of the year I 197J 1 
the matter would be straightened out and substitute collateral 
provided and that the note would be exclusively the Gregor ys' th er-
after. (IC Watts Depo. 13-19> She reiterates that she was 
reassured of that by Steven L. Adamson, PCA' s representative, w•t: 
whom they dealt at the time of the sale to the Gregorys. IP.14-1' 
Perhaps the most explicit testimony came in response to cross-
examination from Dr. Gregory's attorney. The witness test1fiPJ 
the promissory notes were brought to Watts' residence by members 
of the Gregory family. She was then asked: 
''Q. Do you recall when those notes were presented to y0u clny 
statements being made by any member of the Gregory fam1l1 
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1 don't recall any statements at the time, no. 
Any reasons why you were being asked to sign expressed by any 
member of the Gregory family? 
Just that we owned the property and the property was still in 
our name and we were just signing for that reason. 
Did a member of the Gregory family tell you that or was that 
your understanding through your relationship with PCA? 
I ; It was more our understanding with the relationship with PCA. 
,,, Christensen: "Okay." 
FURTHER EXAMINATION 
;y MR. SCHOFIELD: 
With respect to that, Mrs. Watts, that, you think, came about 
because of your conversation with Mr. Adamson. 
And did it come about because of any other conversations or 
discussions someone from PCA. 
I don't recall. 
The only one you do recall is this conversation in August 
with Mr. Adamson? 
';, Yes." (IC.Watts Depo. 57-58) 
Sometime in 1980 Dr. Gregory vacated the subject farm 
'1d PCA, while denying that it "had taken possession" of the real 
:r~oerty, did admit that they entered into an agreement with Milo 
''otcs on June 1, 1980, to "finance the farming operation of the 
;:irty, II (PCA Answers to Interrogatories #10, R.181) 
Boyer indicated: 
''Jn the forepart of '80, which would have gone from March 
into June, we made efforts to talk with Milo as to the 
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poss1:::.11.1-:_·:' r': Jf'PrJ.· l~:~l ':.~ ...... ~.1:-11 :,~'r •"'1~") _..:;J~··r hi'.,.;\: 
.,,..~r]' hes.i.•.ctn~ ':.c jc ~; 1) i;;d 1.:..,! :;ot .,..in• .. ,J r,.,,~,'m·:> i~:·: 
w l ':_ h .:._ t . As 
t c ::: ,J s t -= rr, :i r1 : '.' f > -~ .. ,.. ~ t_> •: 3. '1' I -\ n J .. ~ l ,1 ~ \., 1 ; r ~ ,i, : ' 'I j ~ \~ 0 f-' 
J n f pas l o l e , \'\ ;,, : c- (11 j c r ~ ~ r t c cc, me .:.. :1 1 :-. a ':.. 1 "'t'.> ~ ~ d r ; ,._, 
oµert .. l<:n :ca·.;1ng ~:: :ndriag~mPnt 11'/St-->:~ 1s J PCA 
r ~pr'!~,~ n tat l '/ t:> • 
•o. J!.d J'OU ma:iaqP l t : er th a': summer? 
"A. Yes, j1d." 1 I Boyer Jepo. 2-, 
"lr. ·..iatts ~pent 'h<> summer of l980 harvesting hay, 
r~1~vel1nq the ground and 1rr1gat1no I I Milo Watts Depa. 24-~. 
34, C-2; At the .ond of the season, after 
pr•.•par1~0 the ground f::ir replanting seed, PCA, through its 
representative, Mr. Ch1~ds, refused to pay the $1,500.00 or •· 
dol 1.,r~ n..-.•ri•.•d to buy the necessary seed for planting. I I M \>ia'" 
:Jepo. 14-<; l Boy<>r ::Jepo. 29-31, 56-7l There was cons1derao:~ 
cont l 1.-t.1nu •est 1mony about <>fforts at m1t1gat1on in three ard· 
at t<>mpted r»s" 111 ng of the farm I I Boyer :Jepo. 4 3-46; Chi 1 ds :ec 
ll-40 1nterterenc<> oy PCA with eftorts to resell the pror~r·c 
C Watts Depa. 24-
lu•:ro>asonabll1ty 2~ ;iroco>eds :rom tne sal~ of the 1480 crop 
hay and qr.un 11 •.· .. arts '.:lepo. 22-3; I Boyer Depo. J2-37l; ""h~· 
the stamped-on leqa; jescr:pt1on on the ·~ree promissory n0• 00 
s l il n t:> d by t hf" W a t ~ c; -'a s t i l : t~ d i n cit-:>SCI"lO~nq ~hP re3l ;·f()l\f.}: 
,._ ", .... ~. 
.,,.,-.,, :1, .. ,s::ock 11 Boyer ::Jepo. 50-51; I C.iolatts Depo. 44, 49-
.- .,,:er c>"rta1n expenditures, lncluding expenditures for 
ct ~ttorneys and Arizona taxes without consultation or 
,; from iolatts are chargeable to Watts 'I B.Gregory Depo. 26, 
3oy2r ::Jepo. 14-15; R. 90J; and specific matters regarding 
'l' c1cat1on of proceeds, credits and payments on PCA's 
"n'.':19 IR. 90-l; Amended by Allen Affid., R. 262; Brown Letter-
of Supp. Record). 
From the foregoing, 1t must be obvious to all that as of 
~nd of 1980, had the matter come to trial, there would have 
· no possibility for summary judgment in favor of any party, 
he1ng a multitude of factual questions to be resolved. 
This was all dramatically changed by the execution of 
Settlement Agreement by PCA and Gregorys on July 16, 1981 . 
. b8-28SJ It was on the basis of that Settlement Agreement that 
.< .. lants Watts made their Motion for Summary Judgment, which the 
u.t1mately granted. More will be said about that and the 
relating to it and the consequences flowing therefrom in the 
:_~~~t portion of this brief. 
ARGUMENT 
POI'.'JT I. THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY RULED THAT DEFENDANTS 
•ERE ACCOMMODATION MAKERS. 
·Counsel for PCA, in Point I of his Argument, under the 
·· :•at :~ere are issues of ~act, argues that defendants 
··""'" 1or i:na::-:· ·~o. iciors, rather than accommodation makers and 
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in support of that assertion selectively chooses from the 
documents noted heretofore in our Statement of Facts at length su 
much of them as allude to the original collateral first pledged 1 , 
the Watts loan of 1974, coupled with some after-the-fact 
affidavits acquired from three former employees of PCA <Mills, 
Naylor and Wood). All of those affidavits were objected to and 
were moved to be stricken by Watts for several reasons, not the 
least of which that they were self-serving, presumed to express a 
corporate opinion, and further presumed to suggest what was in the 
minds of parties not testifying and could not accordingly be bas~ 
on personal knowledge. The Court did not rule on any of the 
Motions to Strike, and it is submitted by the undersigned that it 
is immaterial whether they were to be accepted as part of the 
record or not because the affidavits miss the point, as does the 
Argument of PCA's counsel. 
Being an accommodation maker or a primary obligor is no· 
a question of the "intent" of the would-be creditor or holder of 
creditor or beneficiary of an obligation, but rather a matter of 
fact. It is to be noted, however as an example, that the 
paragraph cited from Mr. Wood, who was incidentally involved with 
the renewal- note, loan action report and credit notice letter 
<Items 2 and 3 noted above) is impeached by those very documPnts 
as noted above under the heading "Loan History," "Financial 
Information," the letter addressed solely to Gregory, and the face 
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sregory's financial statement, as well as Watts', was spelled 
It is also to be noted that counsel for PCA adds 
.i~guage at page 10 and 11 of its brief that does not appear in 
:.1e record, calling the first mortgage on 109 acres, the "(Watts 
cmel" and the second mortgage on 1,257 acres "(Watts farm)." The 
' :arentheses additions are voluntary surplus of counsel and are not 
.1 the original documents and were never identified as such in the 
:ecord or in the depositions. Indeed, Tom Boyer thought 109 acres 
~s acreage owned by Gregory located somewhere in the Fillmore 
irea. III Boyer Depo. 41, 48, 50, 51> Unquestionably part of the 
Mrtgaged property described in the exhibits belonged to Milo 
iatts as obviously a portion of it was the 480 acres sold to 
~~cry, but there is nothing in the record to identify on any of 
'he documents listing collateral to actually specifically identify 
.. ie 480 acres with which we are here involved. 
The undersigned also disputes PCA's counsel's argument 
:~t Watts received a "direct benefit" in these transactions. 
'oart from the fact that the amount assumed by Gregorys was 
ipproximately $74,000.00, not $105,000.00 as noted in the 
·:c,tement of Facts above, the matter of benefit is a question of 
0 ns1deration running between Gregorys and Watts, not between PCA 
~at ts . 
PCA asserts that Section 70A-3-606, Utah Code Annotated, 
J\J, is not applicable in this case since it relates only to 
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parties holding a right of recourse, i.e., accommodation part1" 
and PCA asserts that Watts are not accommodation parties. 
PCA's assertion, it appears, is based upon a 
misunderstanding of the law of accommodation parties as it rela:· 
to the law of primary and secondary liability. PCA asserts tha: 
because the Watts' signatures appear on the note as co-signers, 
they cannot be accommodation parties. It is apparently PCA's 
belief that since a co-signer is primarily liable, he cannot be a· 
accommodation party. Under this view only parties secondarily 
liable on instruments can be accommodation parties. That is, of 
course, clearly not the law. The doctrine of primary and 
secondary liability is a doctrine which relates primarily to the 
holder of the note (creditor). If a party to the note is 
primarily liable, then the holder can proceed against him 
forthwith. On the other hand, a party who is secondarily liable 
can only be proceeded against after the creditor has taken cerL1L 
preliminary steps as to the party or parties primarily liable. 
It is irrelevant whether a party is primarily or 
secondarily liable as it relates to accommodation parties. The 
rights of the creditor against parties primarily liable are t~e 
same whether such parties receive the benefit of the cons1der3t 
or merely sign to allow someone else to receive that bener 1' 
(aside from issues relating to discharge). On the other han~. 
doctrine of accommodation parties is a doctrine which relates 
primarily to the relationship between che debtors themselves. 
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1ne states in substance that as between debtors, the party 
:~ce1ves the benefit of the consideration must reimburse the 
to the note who did not receive such consideration in the 
~nt such party sustains a loss by virtue of default on the note, 
-at 1s to say the accommodation party is given recourse over 
" 1 nst the accommodated party for any loss sustained by the 
.::ommodation party. 
Section 70A-3-415 states in subparagraph 1 as follows: 
"An accommodation party is one who signs the instrument 
1n any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to 
another party to it." (Emphasis added.) 
It is thus clear that the accommodation party can be a 
i\or, drawer, endorser, co-maker, or can sign on a note in any 
·1er capacity. Subparagraph 5 of said section states: 
"An accommodation party is not liable to the party 
acco~Tiodated, and if he pays the instrument has a right of 
recourse on the instrument against such party." (Emphasis 
added.) 
Comment 1 to the official text of the Uniform Commercial 
·Je found under Section 3-415 states as follows: 
"l. Subsection (1) recognizes that an accommodation 
party is always a surety (which includes a guarantor>, and it 
is his only distinguishing feature. He differs from other 
sureties only in that his liability is on the instrument and 
he is a surety for another party to it. His obligation is 
therefore determined by the capacity in which he signs. An 
e~commodation maker or acceptor is bound on the instrument 
•1thout any resort to his principal, while an accommodation 
1ndorser may be liable only after presentment, notice of 
dishonor and protest. The subsection recognizes the defenses 
nf a surety in accordance with the provisions subjecting one 
not a holder in due course to all simple contract defenses, 
as well as his rights against his principal after payment. 
Under subsection (3) except as against a holder in due course 
·•1thout notice of the accommodation, parol evidence is 
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admissible to prove that the party has signed for 
accommodation." 
As 2 F. Hart and W. Willier, Bender's Uniform CommercialCode 
Service§ 13.03 states at 13-10 <1983): 
"Equally confused and misleading has been the use of the 
terms 'secondary'and 'primary' with reference to contract~: 
liability and to the suretyship transaction. In the 
suretyship sense, 'secondary' simply refers to the fact that 
the obliger rather than the surety ought to pay or perform; 
hence, his obligation is 'primary' and the surety's 
•secondary.' However, in a contractual sense, 'secondary' 
refers to conditional liability, i.e., conditions precendent 
to the promiser's duty of performance, while 'primary' refers 
to an unconditional or absolute duty to perform. Thus, a 
surety is always 'secondarily' liable in the suretyship 
sense, but he may be either 'primarily' or 'secondarily' 
liable in the contractual sense, depending upon the terms~ 
his agreement with the obligee. (Emphasis added.) 
Thus an accommodation maker is primarily or secondarily 
liable to the holder of the note depending on the capacity in 
which he signs, a maker being primarily liable, and an endorser 
being secondarily liable, but as between an accommodation party 
and the accommodated party, the accommodation party is "always a 
surety." 
The Watts then as accommodation parties are always 
sureties as to the Gregorys and thus are entitled to recourse 
against Gregorys on the notes. 
This is obviously a doctrine based upon principles of 
fair play and good conscience. If the accommodation party is made 
to pay the obligation, but has no right of recourse against the 
accommodated party, then the accommodated party is granted an 
unconscionable benefit. He gets the benefit of the proceeds ot 
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,e note, but never has to pay anyone for them. The same is true 
the right of recourse is in any way limited or impaired. 
It is clear in the instant case that from and after the 
·igning of the Uniform Real Estate Contract between Watts and 
;regory, the Wat ts became accornrnoda t ion parties as to Gregory. It 
_5 true that at the time of the signing of that note the Watts 
1wed PCA an indebtedness on the farm of approximately $74,000.00. 
jowever, Gregory assumed that indebtedness as a part of the 
;urchase price (i.e., he got an equity in the land commensurate 
'•1th said assumed debt), and thus as between Watts and Gregory it 
:ecame the indebtedness of Gregory. Indeed we can say that in 
of feet Watts paid Gregory to assume said debt--to make it his. It 
:s thus clear that from and after the signing of that contract, 
:he original Watts' indebtedness became the indebtedness of 
;regory as between Watts and Gregory. Gregory had received a 
:ons1deration for assuming that debt in the nature of part payment 
}f the purchase pr ice. 
Furthermore, from and after the date of the signing of 
"hat contract, all monies disbursed by PCA for the farm or in 
~nnection therewith inurred to the benefit of the equitable owner 
.f the farm, to-wit, Gregory, the contract purchaser. 
· .sbursements from PCA for improvements on the farm could not 
Jre to the benefit of Watts. Even if the value of the farm had 
"
0 n doubled or tripled by said disbursements, that increase in 
11 -1e could not help Watts. Any improvements to the farm through 
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disbursements from PCA would inure in law to the benefit of 
Gregory. From and after the date of the signing of that contracl, 
Gregory was deemed the owner of the farm in equity, and Watts were 
deemed to have a scurity interest only. It is thus inescapable 
that as between Watts and Gregory, Watts was an accommodation 
maker and Gregory was the accommodated party, both as to the 
original debt and as to all subsequent loans, the proceeds of 
which went entirely to Gregorys by the undisputed facts. 
As noted throughout the Statement of Facts above, 
Gregorys asked for and received all the increases extended by PCA, 
wrote all the drafts spending the same to pay their bills-
-including the only installment paid to Watts on the Uniform Real 
Estate Contract. 
PCA has claimed that Watts did get one benefit, and that 
is that one of the disbursements to Gregory was used by him to pay 
one annual installment to Watts on the Uniform Real Estate 
Contract. This cannot be deemed to be a disbursement to Watts 
from PCA, such as would preclude Watts from being an accommodation 
party for a number of reasons: First, the Watts were not advised 
until long after the fact that Gregory had so used the money. 
Second, only after the money was chargeable to Gregory did he th~ 
use it to pay his debt to Watts. Third, Gregory had a duty to 
Watts an annual payment of $24,500.00. The money he got from PLA 
he used to discharge that debt. He borrowed $24,500.00 and got 
the full use of it in paying his debt in that amount. Watts on 
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ce other hand had a right to receive $24,500.00 on the annual 
;ayrnent without having that amount charged against his collateral. 
or the $24, 500. 00 Watts received he cancelled $24, 500. 00 of debt 
~ich Gregory owed him in the land contract and he got charged 
, 1 t~ $24,500.00 against his home and other land. The net result 
0 Watts therefore is a $24,500.00 deficit. It must therefore be 
1 Jbv1ous that Gregory got the only real benefit and Watts once 
igain just got used. 
Furthermore, the PCA indebtedness was at a much higher 
interest rate < 12 .18% - R.17) than the land contract C 7% - R. 50 l, 
~Watts is additionally hurt in that regard. 
PCA asserts that some of the money went to pay "joint 
obligations" of Watts and Gregory. There is not one shred of 
e'1idence of this. Watts and Gregory did not owe anyone anything 
wi~ly, except PCA, and the disbursements from PCA obviously did 
oot go back to PCA. Watts and Gregory were not joint operators of 
1 '.he farm and there simply were no such joint debts. 
Finally, on this point, PCA, in knowingly and secretly 
idvancing money to Gregory for him to make an illusory payment to 
~tts, does not constitute good faith dealing. Watts as 
i~commodation maker was entitled to know of any significant fact 
~nown to PCA that effected his suretyship position. Watts had a 
1'Jht to be timely advised that Gregory did not have money for the 
:;inual payment in order to permit Watts to take steps to timely 
,cotect himself. Instead PCA let him become so deeply enmeshed in 
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·:e '.arm which Gregorys wera buying from Watts and that 
:•1 ''-'"m,•nt would in nowisP inurt> to the benefi<::. of the 
=.nee PCA knew that, although Watts were co-signers on the 
· J•,r•·s "•"'''' bound by the law applicable to tne Uni form 
· , ... •.:ontract ex1st1nc; hetween tht>m and by the law of 
~·· :·•n makers to reimburse Watts for any amount which Watts 
h·· v1rtuP of the loans of PCA to Gregorys. 
; ~urther statutory provision applicable to the facts of 
'~ t :ounJ in thP r;n1form Commerc1al Code at Section 70A-3-
;ir:;v1des: 
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respect to any such person does not discharge any pa,t·; 
as to whom presentment, protest or not ice of dishonor ;. 
effective or unnecessary; or 
( b) unjustifiably impairs any collateral for the instrument 
given by or on behalf of the party or any person aga1ns· 
whom he has a right of recourse. 
( 2) Sy express reservation of rights against a party with a 
right of recourse the holder preserves 
(a) all his rights against such party as of the time when 
the instrument was originally due; and 
( b) the right of the party to pay the instr11ment as of that 
time; and 
(c) All rights of such party to recourse against others." 
<Emphasis added.) 
The Uniform Commercial Code thus also provides that if 
the holder of a note (PCA in this case) discharges any party to 
the instrument (Gregorys in this case) without "express 
reservation of rights as "against a party" thereto, such party or 
parties are released, and it is thus clear that the Watts must be 
deemed to be totally released under the circumstances of this case 
inasmuch as there certainly was no express reservation of rights 
against them. 
It its brief PCA at tempts to rely on the fact that the 
name "Watts" appears in the Settlement Agreement. It is true that 
the Watts name does appear in the Agreement, but it cannot, by an. 
stretch of the imagination, be deemed to be an "express 
reservation of rights." We do not think that the references t0 
the Watts are even an implied reservation of rights, but even if 
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are granted that exalted status, such reservation certainly 
;~es not amount to an "express reservation of rights." 
"Express" is defined by Black's Law Dictionary as 
I 'allows: 
"EXPRESS. Clear; definite; explicit; unmistakable; not 
dubious or ambiguous. In re Moon's Will, 107 Vt. 92, 176 A. 
410, 412. Clear, definite, plain, direct. State ex rel. 
l\ndrews v. Zangerle, 101 Ohio St. 235, 128 N.E. 165, 167. 
Declared in terms; set forth in words. Directly and 
distinctly stated. State ex rel. Ashauer v. Hostetter, 344 
Mo. 665, 127 S.W. 2d 697, 699. Explicit. Elliott v. Hudson, 
117 W,Va. 345, 185 S.E. 465,467; made known distinctly and 
explicitly, and not left to inference. Minneapolis Steel & 
Machinery Co. v. Federal Surety Co., C.C.A.Minn., 34 F.2d 
270, 274. Manifested by direct and appropriate language, as 
distinguished from that which is inferred from conduct. The 
word is usually contrasted with 'implied.' State v. Denny, 
118 Ind. 449, 21 N.E. 274, 4 L.R.A. 65." (See page 691 of 
the 4th Edition.) 
The Settlement Agreement was executed July 16, 1981, and 
•s clearly a document running solely between PCA and Buford A. and 
:lizabeth A. Gregory, who were the only signatories thereon. 
·~re are some ancillary references only to Watts. These largely 
;ppear in the "Recitals" where the Watts name is mentioned only in 
~n~ection with the instant lawsuit. The critical paragraph is 
~. 6 on page 4 where, after excluding the new obligations agreed 
:o by the parties in paragraphs 1 through 5 of the Agreement, PCA 
1en does 
"release and discharge Gregorys and each of them from any and 
all liability which they may have to PCA under the 
Gregory/Watts notes, under the Gregory note, under the 
mortgage, under any security agreements, under the Assignment 
of Equity, and under any other documents of security given to 
PCA by Gregorys, or either of them, to secure their 
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indebtedness to PCA under the Gregory/Watts notes and the 
Gregory note, provided, however, this release shall not 
constitute a release of any obligations of Gregorys to PCA 
under the documents and covenants set forth in paragraphs J 
through 5 hereof. From and after the execution hreof, PCA's 1 
sole remedy for sums due it from Gregorys under the 
Gregory/Watts notes shall be through foreclosure sale of ~. 
Gregory farm and/or the Home Farm and PCA's sole remedy for 
recovery for the sums due it from the Gregorys under the 
Gregory note shall and under those documents and covenants 
set forth in paragraphs l through 5 hereof. (Emphasis 
added. J 
The most that can be said about the above language is 
the use of the words "foreclosure sale" and the use of the phrase 
"the Home Farm" are in PCA's view implied references to Watts, but 
that language, when it is qualified twice by the underlined 
language reducing it to remedies against Gregorys "for sums due 1t 
from the Gregorys" clearly negates such an argument. 
PCA then alludes to paragraph 8 proposing it a 
stipulation to be filed in the lawsuit in the form as the attach~ 
Exhibit E provides. (R.284-SJ It is to be noted that all four 
paragraphs of said stipulation make no reference whatever--impli~ 
or expressed--to the Watts, and that document is the release of 
parties in this matter. PCA' s counsel quotes paragraphs 2 and l 
again with relation to foreclosing any right, title and interest 
"of Gregorys" and counsel then makes the novel argument that not 
mentioning Watts is somehow an express reservation of rights 
against them and further attempts to buttress his argument hy 
quoting from an affidavit of Anthony Schofield in which Schof1el·i 
presumes to say, "It was expressly understood between all parties 
to the stipulation that plaintiff in this matter would proceed as 
' -38- I _...... 
inst defendant Watts." <R. 266 l Watts, through their counsel, 
oov~ to strike this affidavit on the grounds that the statement 
:c:inot be based upon personal knowledge and cannot presume to 
,, 1ggest what was in the mind of other parties or persons. (R.292) 
.\part from its self-serving character and presumptuousness in 
purporting to allege what was in the minds of Gregorys and/or 
'.heir attorneys, there is the direct contradiction in the 
;r.equivocal language of the Glen Clark and Tom Christensen 
.\ffidavit (R.Vol.l,296) at paragraph 2, which reads in part: 
"At no time during the settlement negotiations or 
thereafter until November 11, 1981, did any of the parties to 
the Settlement Agreement and/or their counsel request, give 
or in any form mention an express reservation of rights as to 
Milo and Cleown Watts in connection with the three promissory 
notes referred to in paragraph A of the Recitals contained in 
the Settlement Agreement." (Emphasis added.) 
It was at this November 11, 1981, meeting that counsel 
'.~ PCA attempted to obtain signatures of the Gregorys to the 
\Jdendurn to Settlement Agreement {R. 309-10), which by a cursory 
reading makes it clear that PCA was then--five months after the 
~ct--trying to include an express reservation of rights against 
:he Watts that they failed to do on July 16, 1981, when they 
'Xecuted the Settlement Agreement. That position is repeatedly 
001 ne out in the testimony taken in the short depositions of Glen 
ior k, Tom Christensen and Dr. Buford Gregory on November 19, 
id!. While counsel for PCA repeatedly tried to put the words in 
.:ce witnesses' mouths that there was an intent or an understanding 
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or an agreement about reserving claims against the Watts, such 
questions were objected to, but responded to in the negative. 
As PCA's brief notes, they repeatedly allude to the 
"Farm" rather than the Watts personally. PCA's counsel fails to 
note Clark's own objection except as he alluded to it in his 
answer. 
But such parole evidence is inadmissible, particularly in 
light of paragraph 13 of the Settlement Agreement, entitled 
"Integration:" 
"This agreement constitutes the entire agreement among 
the parties pertaining to the subject matter hereof, and 
supersedes all prior agreements and understandings pertain1~ 
thereto. No covenant, representation or condition not 
expressed in this agreement shall affect or be deemed to 
interpret, change or restrict the express provisions hereoL' 
(Emphasis added. l 
Such provision, if it is to be given any effect at all precludes 
PCA from here and now trying to represent some other intent beyo~ 
what is clearly expressed in the language within the four corners 
of the document itself. That argument should further be 
buttressed by the fact that the Clark/Christensen Affidavit makes 
it clear that the Settlement Agreement was prepared by counsel fm 
PCA with only some minor changes suggested by Christensen with 
regard to the new collateral referred to in said Agreement. 
CR.Vol.1,296) 
Accordingly, the long-standing rule that a document 
shall be construed most strictly against the party preparing 1t 
should here be given effect. 
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The Clark/Christensen testimony is further inadmissible 
, che reasons stated by Clark (omitted in PCA brief) before he 
"Mr. Clark: I will object to questions about that 
.wersation on the ground that the conversation was in connection 
,;tn an Addendum in the Settlement Agreement, and the conversation 
wolved settlement and, therefore, is not admissible." <Clark 
>po 6 I 
It is thus clear that the Watts must be deemed to be 
:oleased by failure of PCA to provide for an "express 
:eservation." The case law likewise makes inevitable the the same 
·o~cl us ion. 
Melo v. National Fuse, 267 Fed Supp 611 CD.Colo., 1967) 
.rivolved a mining accident which injured the plaintiff. The 
'1aintiff initially brought suit in the state of Utah against 
cOJan Powder Co., and that case was settled and a stipulation of 
.:smissal signed and an order of dismisal entered pursuant 
:~reto. Later on the plaintiff sued another defendant in the 
·1strict of Colorado for the same injury. The court held that the 
:cah law governed and that the action of the plaintiff was 
.:reclosed by the provisions of the Uniform Joint Obligations Act 
·:und at 15-4-1 et seq. The court stated at page 613: 
"Having received a substantial amount from the Trojan 
Powder Co. in full settlement, and having dismissed his 
action against that company on the merits and with prejudice 
but without reserving any rights, plaintiff thus released the 
present defendant. The motion for summary judgment is well 
taken." <Emphasis added.) 
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In Williams v.Greene, 506 P2d 64, the Supreme Court n 
Utah affirmed the granting of a motion for summary judgment 
dismissing the action. In that case the plaintiff sustained se~ 
burns, for which he brought an action against an oil company. 
That action was settled and a release executed. The court act1c 
against the oil company was "fully compromised and settled" and 
that action dismissed with prejudice. Ten months later plaint1f· 
brought a suit for the same injuries against a physician for 
malpractice, and the court held at page 65: 
"The appellant, not having responded to facts properly 
demanded under the rules, but preferring to argue about the 
elusive factor of intent in signing the full, complete, 
unreserved release of all claims, hardly can pursue a claim 
years later without substantial and meaningful reason." 
(Emphasis added.) 
It is thur clear that having failed to reserve his 
rights against the doctor in the Williams case, the same were lM: 
to the plaintiff. 
In Greenhalch v. Shell Oil Co., 78 Fed 2d 942 ClO Cir. 
1935), a case applying Utah law, the injured plaintiff executed ar 
agreement releasing and discharging one obligor, and the agreement 
contained a reservation of rights which would still permit him t 0 
sue "any physician or surgeon for malpractice or neglect." The 
court there recognized plaintiff's right under the Act to make 
such a reservation and the court held that in a later suit aga 1 ·'' 
Shell Oil Co. the prior release operated as an absolute defense 
The court stated at page 945 as follows: 
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"There being no written reservation of right against 
defendant, as provided in section 4, we conclude that the 
release given discharged defendant from liability, if any, 
for plantiff's fall." 
We also cite to the court the case of Mills v. Standard 
'.i~le, 577 P2d 756, a 1978 Colorado case, where the court held 
"~age 759: 
"Here, if Standard were not released, then the estate 
would be liable on the indemnity agreement for damages later 
recovered by Mills against Standard. Obviously, that was not 
the intent of the release issued to the estate. We agree 
with the view that the objective circumstances were not 
sufficient to indicate an intention not to release Standard." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In Sims v.Western Steel Co., 551 F.2d 811, 818 ClOthCir. 
_377 I a release of a direct infringer of patent also operated to 
·elease the party which allegedly induced the infringement, since 
:he release did not contain any reservation of rights against the 
second party. 
In Matland v. U.S., 285 F.2d 752, 755 <3rd Cir. 1961) 
:.\e release of an airline by the surviving spouse of a passenger 
(.\led in a collision released the United States from a claim 
based upon the alleged negligence of its employees, since the 
sectlement agreement with the airline did not include reservation 
;frights against the United States. 
Thus, a review of the cases in which these statutes have 
_,"" applied indicates that the courts strictly construe these 
''atutes to release from liability a co-obliger against whom an 
:tJ1gee does not make an express reservation of rights in a 
settlement agreement with another co-obliger. In none of the 
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cases in which Section 15-4-4 has been applied did a court, on 
•equitable" or other grounds, refuse to find that a settlement 
agreement in which an obligee released one co-obligor from 
liability failed to discharge another co-obligor against whom nc 
express reservation of rights had been made in the settlement 
agreement. Neither did a court, in any of these cases, look 
outside the terms of the settlement agreement to find reservati~ 
of rights against a co-obligor, or that, notwithstanding the 
express terms of the settlement agreement, a party intended to 
reserve its rights against another and that, therefore, an expres 
reservation of rights should be read into the settlement agreYer· 
on "equitable" grounds. 
Although a mortgage foreclosure action is equitable in 
nature, that very fact militates against PCA. It is a well-
established maxim that equity will not lend its aid to assist a 
party in achieving an unfair or inequitable purpose. 
It must be clear to every fair-minded person that 
Gregory ought in good conscience to have paid the entire debt to 
PCA because he assumed for a valuable consideration the original 
debt and because all subsequent disbursements went to him. Not 
only does PCA make no effort to bring about that result, or eve11 
assist therein, but it actually takes the unbelievable step of 
releasing Gregory from the entire secured debt. In so doing PO 
is saying in effect that it has no need to pursue equity. It 15 
saying that, although you, Dr. Gregory, got the money from us,~ 
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make Watts pay the bill in its entirety. PCA has 
2 i 1berately and with cold and calculated purpose chosen to ignore 
,, '~' .._ y . 
PCA sought to lay a snare for Watts and make them pay 
.ith their home and everything they have for that which they did 
~--3...~~· and instead it complains that is has ensnarred itself. 
Having failed to do equity, it can scarcely seek it 
1ere. 
In the instant case. if the Watts are not released, then 
:,regorys have achieved nothing by virtue of the aforesaid 
Settlement Agreement with PCA because they are still subject to 
SJ! t by Wat ts, and it is clear that Gregorys did not enter into an 
agreement which would yield them no benefit whatsoever. 
PCA urges special significance to the language in the 
Settlement Agreement that PCA and Gregorys will "work together to 
conclude the litigation between them and Watts." If Watts are not 
·eteased, however, by the Settlement Agreement, how can PCA help 
Gi egory in the Crossclaim of Watts against Gregory? PCA would try 
:,, get as large a judgment as it could against Watts, and Watts 
•ill then be entitled to that same large judgment against 
~regorys. How does that help Gregory? Furthermore, how can 
:,, e3ory help PCA? If Watts is not released from liability, it 
: be in the best interests of Gregory to work to keep any PCA 
" 1>iinPnt small. No doubt Gregory felt that in signing the 
)ettlement Agreement he was concluding the litigation as to Watts. 
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PCA has urged that the existence of the suit is an 
express reservation. Under Section 15-4-4 the express reservat:· 
must be "in writing and as part of the same transaction as the 
release." The suit was filed years before and is not a part of 
the same transaction. Whether suit has been filed or not, the: 
obligors are such because of certain conduct or a contract 
existing before the suit. Settlement of that conduct or contract 
is the same, whether or not the suit exists--only the mechanics 
may be different. 
PCA sets out a quotation from Anderson, Uniform 
Commercial Code, Vol. 2, page 131, Section 3-601:11. This is 
found at page 20 of appellant's brief. <This language is now 
found in Volume 3 of the Second Edition at page 131, Section 3· 
606:11.J The author in support of his statement that "other 
circumstances of the transaction" may disclose the reservation 
cites only one case, Parnes v. Celia's, Inc., 99 New Jer. Sup. 
179, 239 Atl.2d 19. In that case the reservation was in the 
contractual documents (exchange of letters) and was an express 
reservation. It is therefore no authority for the proposition 
that circumstances may show an express reservation. It is true 
that the Uniform Commercial Code Section (70A-3-606) does not 
require a writing, but Section 15-4-4 does require a writing, an.c 
thus even if circumstances could show a reservation under the uc: 
provision, they cannot show the same under Section 15-4-4. 
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PCA's efforts at construction of the Settlement 
Aqreement in an attempt to make what is at best inference and 
:~plication rise to the measure of express language, regardless of 
~ow it tries to torture the language of its own choosing in that 
~ttlement Agreement, there is not by any reasonable rendering "an 
express reservation of rights" against the Watts. If PCA has 
~lieved that it could release all liability on the notes and 
still proceed on the collateral, it has made an erroneous decision 
u to the law, which clearly provides that release of the debt 
1 
releases the collateral. In this connection it should also be 
noted that in paragraph 6 of the Settlement Agreement Gregory is 
oeing released from the notes and from the "Mortgage." 
PCA had the opportunity and indeed the duty to obtain 
from Gregory his collateral in the form of Arizona land to secure 
lor pay) the entire PCA debt, which was rightfully his debt. 
Instead of doing that, PCA has actually taken an assignment of the 
entire Arizona collateral (which at the time of the Settlement 
Agreement was in the form of a contract receivable providing for 
~ayment to Gregorys of the sum of $283,961.38 secured by a trust 
jeed on said Arizona land) as security for PCA' s unsecured debt of 
;pproximately $30,000.00. (R.281,282) PCA has therefore released 
.•regorys of all liability on the notes and entered into 
~chinations designed to allow Gregorys to retain all but about 
))0,000.00 of the Arizona collateral, being a net amount of about 
<8$253,000.00, and after all of that asserts the right to require 
)j Am Jur 2d, Mortgages, Section 394. 
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Watts to pay the whole debt. That, we respectfully submit, is 
not equity. 
POINT III. NUMEROUS FACTUAL ISSUES EXIST RELATl'.. 
TO THE CLAIM OF PCA WHICH PRECLUDE SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN ITS FAVOi. 
EVEN IF WATTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
The thrust of PCA's Point V is that it is entitled tn 
summary judgment. We believe that the foregoing arguments as 
contained in this brief show that Watts were entitled to summary :i 
judgment. However, even if Watts were not entitled to said sumrna: .J 
judgment, there would still remain in the action a multitude of 
factual issues raised in the lower court regarding PCA' s claims J:I 
which would have to be tried, including at least the following: idc 
1. Were the increases in the loans made upon the 
representation that substitute collateral would be obtained? :2l 
2. The three promissory notes signed by the Watts as '~ 
accommodation makers as they now appear bear a stamp imprint 
thereon purporting to render them secured by the original 
mortgage. Watts assert that said stamps were placed thereon af'.· 
:~a 
!CA 
they were signed. Is that the fact and, if so, were they inten'.· !0 t 
to be collateralized by the substitute collateral belonging to 
Gregory? 
3. Was the security agreement intended to include 
cattle of Watts? or of Gregory? or did it.relate to crops only 
contained in the printed portions, since it was signed in blan~ 
Was it signed in blank? 
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4. Would Watts be chargeable with expenditures on the 
1c,s made for purposes not related to the farm, such as expenses 
'r12ona and payments to Watts themselves on the Uniform Real 
.ate Contract? 
5. Having undertaken to run the farm, and thereafter 
30anJoning that undertaking, did PCA properly mitigate damages? 
6. Watts assert that during the time PCA operated the 
:nm I after corrunencement of this action) it has failed to account 
:Jr the amounts earned by it. 
7. Did an impairment of collateral take place when 
~tpe purchased for use on the farm for $38,000.00 and constituting 
;jd1tional collateral, was sold for $7,500.00? (See R.303-306) 
8. Watts assert that PCA hindered efforts of Watts to 
:'ell the farm and have, among other things, instructed personnel 
et PCA to inform prospective buyers inquiring about the property 
:\at it was unavailable, have failed and refused to disclose 
:~'ormation concerning the farm to interested parties, and that 
~A has sought to hinder efforts of sale to force the property to 
JC to sheriff's sale in an attempt to obtain all of the Watts' 
"rnd for a depressed and devalued pr ice. 
9. What is the balance owing, if any, after resolution 
:~e above issues? 
10. The affidavits of the Watts stand in opposition to 
affidavits of Thad Allen. The weight to be given would be for 
'C :ourt sitting as a fact finder . 
.. 4 9-
The trial court found on page 3 of the Summar 1 
Judgment (R.402) with regard to PCA's Motion for S'..1mmar1· Judac' 
that: 
"Issues of fact exist which preclude the granting 
thereof, but further finds and determines that the gran::· ' 
of the Watts' Motion for Summary Judgment disposes of :.r:o 
litigation as to the plaintiff." 
We respectfully submit that the trial court was ent::, 
correct in so ruling. 
CONCLUSION 
The Watts have taken nothing from PCA. The de~1s1on 
the trial court has taken nothing from PCA. PCA vol'..lnatrily ~~ 
up its rights. There just is no "express reservation." Th~• 
has been no unjust enrichment of Watts. Watts didn't get tne 
money; they were accommodation makers. As noted oy Mr. Boyer, 
PCA's own employee, Watts were "innocent victims" of these loao' 
If anyone has been unjustly enriched, it is Gregorys--out th1s · 
voluntarily agreed to do. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, 
~~~c-.'~ Vv~7~ 
~.:;. 6 -L '-- ~~ '- ~ --
GORDON A. !'l.ADSEN --
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
